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MARKET ACCESS AND THE GATS AIR TRANSPORT
ANNEXURE: POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR INDIA
UsHA BALASUBRAMANIAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE FORCES of globalization and liberalization erode the
concept of territory and create a borderless regime of trade
which can be rightfully called trade without borders. The World
Trade Organization ("WTO")'is the epicenter of ongoing liber-
alization for the trade of goods, services, and intellectual prop-
erty rights. This Paper examines the issue of market access in
the air transport annex of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS") and possible approaches for India. It goes
without saying that, time and again, many authors have ade-
quately captured the two approaches to gaining market access,
such as negotiating and trading in air traffic rights bilaterally
and multilaterally. At present, air traffic rights of scheduled air
services are negotiated and exchanged on a strict quid pro quo
basis under the framework of the Convention on International
Civil Aviation ("the Chicago Convention"),1 notwithstanding the
presence of a multilateral framework under the Convention.
The International Air Services Transit Agreement, which allows
for exchange of the first two "freedoms of the air,"'2 has the sup-
port of 121 contracting states.' The International Air Transport
* Usha Balasubramaniam, L.L.M in Aviation and Space Laws, Institute of Air
and Space Law, Mc Gill University. Bachelor of Arts & Bachelor of Laws,
National Academy of Legal Studies and Research, Hyderabad, India, 2004.
1 Article 6 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation states, "No sched-
uled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a con-
tracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that
State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization."
Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 6, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. (2)1180,
15 U.N.T.S. 295 [herinafter CICA].
2 International Air Services Transit Agreement art. I, sec. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 59
Stat. 1693, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
3 U.S. Dep't of State, Status of Transit and Transport Agreements, http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/22698.rtf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
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Agreement, which allows for exchange of the third and the
fourth freedoms of the air, also considered the bread-and-butter
rights of the airlines, has even fewer takers-it has the support
of only eleven contracting states.4 In light of this, it appears that
the model of bilateralism has so far been a more widely and suc-
cessfully used tool of gaining market access through the ex-
change of traffic rights vis-;t-vis the multilateral avenues available
for the same under the Chicago Convention framework. If trad-
ing of traffic rights for gaining access via the GATS route were
available to contracting nations of the WTO, what would be the
outcome? Would a developing country like India gain from
making specific commitments with respect to market access
under the GATS framework?
I. MARKET ACCESS IN AIR TRANSPORT
The term "market access" has been used widely in many bilat-
eral and multilateral arrangements, including GATS, but there
is no concrete definition given to this term in any of the current
arrangements covering it. The term "market access" in the air
transport sector refers to the cluster of rights that are negoti-
ated, exchanged, or traded under a plethora of bilateral and
multilateral arrangements as "air traffic rights," and includes
rights such as capacity, frequency, and routes.5 In the chapter of
his book titled Liberalized Trading in Air Transport and the 'Safety
Net,' Dr. Abeyratne has given a broad definition to "market ac-
cess" by stating that it "covers the basic rights of air carriers in
... the operation of air transport services with relevant govern-
mental approval and also subsidiary rights such as production
distribution . . . which are considered ancillary rights."6
4 International Air Transport Agreement art. I, sec.1, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat.
1701, 171 U.N.T.S. 387.
5 See RUWANTISSA I.R. ABEYRATNE, EMERGENT COMMERCIAL TRENDS AND AVIA-
TION SAFETY 69 (1999).
6 Id. A basic market access right is defined as a
conditioned or limited right or privilege (usually set out in an inter-
national agreement) granted by one State to another State for use
by an air carrier or carriers designated by that other State and may
consist of agreed: geographic specifications of routes [that] ... the
air service may take ... ; physical specifications regarding designa-
tion of an air carrier or carriers and how a designated carrier may
employ aircraft; and physical and/or geographic specifications of
what kinds of traffic may be carried. Such rights in total determine
the extent of market access granted.
INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., MANUAL ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT 4.1-2 (1996).
MARKET ACCESS
The current bilateral agreements signed among nations deal
with market access issues on a fair, equitable, reciprocal, and
quid pro quo basis while liberal open sky arrangements that the
United States has entered into with many nations, such as the
Netherlands, Singapore, India, and others, have more relaxed
market access clauses in view of the removal of rigid restrictions
on capacity, route, and frequency.7 Under GATS, specific com-
mitments have to be made in the schedule of the air transport
annex by the contracting states with respect to market access for
the applicability of GATS. s The air transport annex currently
only covers three services:
* aircraft repair and maintenance services;
* selling and marketing of air transport services; and
* computer reservation systems.9
Conspicuously absent from its ambit are scheduled and un-
scheduled air transport services, the inclusion of which would
allow for trading air traffic rights on the multilateral GATS plat-
form. 0 In the past, many attempts were made to include a host
of services-although no consensus was achieved in this re-
gard-by revising and expanding the list of services covered by
the air transport Annex. The prime candidates for inclusion in
the list of services to be covered under the air transport annex
were air cargo services, nonscheduled (charter) services, refuel-
ing services, ground handling services, and certain other auxil-
iary services. To achieve progressive liberalization of the air
transport sector, the aforesaid services should be included in the
annex before contemplating the inclusion of lucrative and zeal-
ously guarded scheduled air traffic services.
III. FACTORS AFFECTING MARKET ACCESS IN THE AIR
TRANSPORT SECTOR
It is important to understand the factors that affect market
access, which in turn affect how a nation chooses between a bi-
lateral model (bilateral air traffic agreement) and multilateral
model (commitment to be made under the GATS Annex on Air
7 Christopher Findlay & Deunden Nikomborirak, Libralization of Air Transport
Services, in OPTIONS FOR GLOBAL TRADE REFORM: A VIEW FORM THE ASIA-PACIFIC
117, 120 (Will Martin & Mari Pangestu eds., 2003).
8 General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XVI, Jan. 1, 1995, 33 I.L.M.
1168 [hereinafter GATS].
9 Id. at Annex on Air Transp. Servs., 3(a)-(e).
10 Id.
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Transport Services) in the event that scheduled air traffic ser-
vices are included in the annex. The main factors affecting mar-
ket access are:
* onerous cabotage restrictions;
* debilitating ownership and control clauses;
* debilitating state aid programs;
* vexatious slot allocations; and
* environmental restrictions."
A. ONEROUS CABOTAGE RESTRICTIONS
In many jurisdictions, and especially in the United States, in-
terior routes (domestic routes) are reserved for domestic carri-
ers only. This is a legal barrier that prevents foreign carriers
from offering their services within the United States, even if they
are willing to offer their services at half the rates of U.S. carriers.
Many authors suggest that this is one of the main reasons that
the motives of the western nations espousing an "open sky pol-
icy" are often doubted. In talks preceding the adoption of an
open sky policy between the United States and the United King-
dom, U.K. authorities expressed apprehension that the agree-
ment would give "U.S. carriers access to countries beyond the
United Kingdom with full commercial traffic rights ... whereas
U.K. carriers would have no right to fly between destinations in
the United States. ' 12 Japan rejected a proposal to sign an open
sky agreement with the United States for much the same rea-
son.13 However, the United States has been successful in con-
cluding open sky bilateral agreements with Singapore and India,
among others. 4 The argument in favor of prohibiting cabotage
emanates from labor economics: if foreign carriers, whose
crews are paid less than their U.S. counterparts, are allowed to
fly within the United States, U.S. carriers would be at a competi-
tive disadvantage.' 5 But the counter-argument lies in the fact
that entry of foreign carriers in the domestic market would in-
crease competition and effectively bring down the fares charged
by domestic carriers (U.S. as well as non-U.S.). This would ben-
efit consumers, inducing them to travel more and lead, in turn,
to overall improved earnings for airlines and increased employ-
'l BRIAN HINDLEY, TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN AVIATION SERVICES: CAN THE DOHA
ROUND FREE FLIGHT? 6-23 (2004).
12 ABEYRATNE, supra note 5, at 50.
13 Id. at 51.
14 Findlay, supra note 7, at 120.
15 HINDLEY, supra note 11, at 8.
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ment.' 6 Another strong argument for imposing cabotage re-
strictions by the United States is the probability of increased
safety, as U.S. safety regulations would likely be better enforced
when imposed on U.S.-owned carriers. However, in the after-
math of September 11, incident safety is the concern of all na-
tions and it is to be expected that regulations would be adhered
to with the same degree of discipline even by non-U.S. owned
carriers. I agree with Brian Hindley when he states, "[A] for-
eign-owned carrier might try legal maneuvers that U.S. carriers
have not tried, though that ... seems unlikely, .. . since both
would be subject to the same U.S. laws ....
B. DEBILITATING OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL CLAUSES
In his article, Robert Ebdon correctly points out that the tradi-
tional Chicago-based system for granting market access to air-
lines for operations to and from their home territory seriously
constrains the right to initiate services covered by the fifth and
sixth freedoms."i He states that the ability to operate from a
base outside an airline's home territory is effectively denied in
almost all instances by ownership and control provisions in bilat-
eral agreements.1 9 In many nations, including the United
States, Canada, and New Zealand, restrictions have been im-
posed on foreign ownership of national carriers. 20 In the Euro-
pean Union, a majority stake must be owned by EU nationals.2 1
However, in the interest of security and because some jurisdic-
tions allow the military to use civilian aircrafts during emergen-
cies, aircrafts operated within a nation should be nationally
owned.22 Further, national ownership of carriers would result in
better enforcement of certain functions, such as registration and
airworthiness.
There is also the belief that the designation requirement of
carriers in open sky agreements and bilateral air agreements al-
most always favors nationals of the designating state.23 The na-
16 Id.
17 Id. at 8.
18 Robert Ebdon, A Consideration of CATS and of its Compatibility with the Existing
Regime for Air Transport, 20 AIR & SPACE L. 75 (1995).
19 Id.
20 HINDLEY, supra note 11, at 7.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 11-12.
23 Assad Kotaite, President of the Council, International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation, Keynote Address at the 56th IATA Annual General Meeting: Aviation
Regulation: New Millennium - New Direction (June 5, 2000).
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tionality requirements lead to the imposition of an artificial
barrier to trade in services, though it is highly unlikely that the
foreign owner would not be subject to the law of the country
where he owns or operates aircraft. Sometimes such a barrier
caused by misguided patriotism may also prevent or delay the
infusion of much needed capital to revive an ailing carrier.
There is a greater challenge involved in liberalizing market ac-
cess by increasing foreign ownership in order to create a com-
petitive global air transport industry. Countries have limits on
foreign ownership which are not uniform. In view of financial
pressures that exist in the airline industry, the 2005 World Trade
Report recommends that it is important to not only privatize,
but it is equally important to ease restrictions on foreign owner-
ship of international carriers. 24 Some steps in the ongoing pro-
cess of liberalization have been taken, such as the liberalization
of the ownership and control rules of the EU common aviation
market to the extent that ownership and control can now be
exercised by a group of nations constituting the common mar-
ket, in contrast to the traditional nationalistic approach. 25 Dr.
Assad Kotaite, former President of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization, pointed out that the lack of a global owner-
ship and control clause has led to indirect methods of obtaining
market access through code sharing arrangements and the for-
mation of global alliances. 26 There has been an attempt to rede-
fine "control" in the U.S.-EU Agreement, which does not
permit non-U.S. ownership of more than 25 percent of U.S. car-
iers, but gives international investors more say in strategic deci-
sions on such matters as marketing, routing and fleeti
structures. 27 Further, in 2002 the Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration decided to liberalize their ownership and control clauses
in bilateral and multilateral agreements by authorizing market
access for designated air carriers that have their principal place
of business and residence in the designating state and have
strong links with the designating states.28
24 WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2005: THEMATIC ESSAY 3 227
(2005).
25 Kotaite, supra note 23.
26 Id.
27 Andrew Compart, U.S., E.U. Close to Landmark Fact Creating 'Open Skies,'
TRAVEL WEEKLY, Nov. 29, 2005, http://www.travelweekly.com/articles.aspx?ar-
ticleid=49214.
28 INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION: A TOOL
FOR THE LIBERALIZATION OF AIR SERVICES 2 (2002), http://www.icao.int/icao/en/
atb/ecp/CaseStudies/ApecConsensus-En.pdf.
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C. VEXATIOUS SLOT ALLOCATION
Airports are imperfectly competitive, generally regarded as
natural monopolies, and in most airports there is a constant de-
mand for slots for access to gates and runways. 29 Typically, in
most major of the heavy-duty airports like Heathrow, there is
more demand for slots than supply.30 So the limited slots have
to be allotted efficiently, without any discrimination made be-
tween foreign and national carriers in order to make the process
fair. 3' Author Brian Hindley points out that
[n]o agreement to liberalize air transport between countries A
and B could long survive a belief on the part of A carriers.., that
slots at airports in B [would be] improperly withheld from A car-
riers and given to B carriers. Slots are essential to doing business,
so a denial of slots to A carriers hands business opportunities to B
carriers at the expense of A carriers.3 2
It is suggested that in certain jurisdictions, such as the United
States and EU, quite a lot of administrative discretion is exer-
cised in the allocation of new slots. 33 "Many slots are de facto
owned by existing airlines through historic use, ... though this
is subject to rules on use ('use it or lose it')."3 4 Slots can be
bought and sold in the United States, and this has been legal
since 1983."5 The United States has legislation that provides for
buying and selling of slots at four of the major airports. 6
Some straightforward rules have to be observed in slot alloca-
tion by airport regulators. 7 Specifically, even if an airport has
spare capacity, it "should not be allowed to charge a price
higher than the marginal cost of using airport facilities. '38 This
allows charging different prices at different times of the day. 9
In 1993, the European Commission set out regulations that deal
29 HINDLEY, supra note 11, at 22.
30 Id. at 20.
31 Id. at 18.
32 Id. at 18.
33 Id. at 19.
34 Id. at 19.
35 Id. at 21. Hindley points out, however, that even though it is legal to buy
and sell slots in the United States, the exact nature of what is being bought and
sold is not clear. Id. FAA Regulations treat slots as privileges and not as rights.
Id.
36 Id.
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with slot allocation.4" However, this is an isolated case. In gen-
eral, there is a conspicuous absence of universal rules setting out
fair and equitable procedures for the allocation of slots between
foreign and local/domestic carriers. If such allocation proce-
dures are established by official action, should foreign airlines
make allegations of partiality in allocation, those allegations
might be justified." Conceivably, a foreign government respon-
sible for allocating slots could impose high landing charges in
order to protect or establish a monopoly of its own carriers.
4 2
Ultimately the passengers of the foreign carrier would bear the
brunt of high fares.43 Hence the allocation of airport slots have
serious competition policy implications.
D. ENVIRONMENTAL RESTRICTIONS
Airport expansion is subject to certain limitations-namely,
environmental restrictions pertaining to aircraft emissions and
noise (the latter being of primary concern to people living near
airports). 44 In their article in the Handbook of Airline Economics,
Gail Butler and Martin Keller point out that both airlines and
airport industries recognize that the effects of their operation
must be judged with respect to impact on the environment.45
The adoption by the International Civil Aviation Organization
of annex 16 to the Chicago Convention, relating to airplane
noise and emissions, underscores the growing focus on the im-
pact that the airline industry has on the environment.
46
The National Environmental Policy Act of 196947 ("NEPA") is
the basis for regulating environmental issues that focus on air-
line construction and management. Since most U.S. airports
serving the commercial airline industry are inextricably depen-
40 Id. at 19-21.
41 Id. at 22.
42 See generally Tony Warren & Christopher Findlay, Competition Policy and Inter-
national Trade in Air Transport and Telecommunication Services, 21(4) THE WORLD
ECONOMY 446-48 (1998).
43 HINDLEY, supra note 11, at 23. Some airport slots are owned by dominant
carriers who may charge scarcity rents. This can lead to high prices, arbitrarily
fixed by the seller. Thus, an effective competition policy is necessary to regulate
prices.
44Id.
45 Gail F. Butler & Martin R. Keller, Airports and Airlines: Analysis of a Symbiotic,
Love-Hate Relationship, in HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE ECONOMICS 87, 88 (DarrylJenkins
ed., 1995).
46 See generally CICA, supra note 1, at Annex 16.
47 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (2006).
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dent on funding from the federal government and concomitant
grant assurances, the majority of airport projects must jump
through NEPA hoops before they can proceed.48 Apart from
NEPA, there are a plethora of state environmental laws in the
United States that impose additional hurdles which are not
likely to ease in the future." Therefore, careful planning and a
cooperative approach are essential from the initial stages of air-
port development.5 ° Such an approach means that in planning
for airport expansion, projected costs take into account the
costs imposed on people living or working in the vicinity of the
airport to be expanded."' This could mean that, should people
living in the vicinity of an airport take airport authorities to
court on any case relating to noise pollution, the cost so borne
should be included in the costs of expanding the airport. It
could also mean that if people in the vicinity have to be relo-
cated, the costs of such relocation should be considered part of
the cost of airport expansion."
Different countries have varying degrees of environmental
protection laws, which impede the ongoing process of liberaliz-
ing the airline/airport industry. In decades to come, major air-
ports in the world will probably experience traffic clogs and look
toward expansion to accommodate increasing traffic and the
everlasting need for increased access. Environmental laws and
activism are likely to make the road to expansion a long haul for
the airlines and airport management.
E. DEBILITATING STATE AID PROGRAMS
European Union carriers are heavily subsidized by the state.52
According to the European Commission:
Community air transport has been characterized by a high level
of State intervention and bilateralism. Although a certain mea-
sure of competition between air carriers was not excluded, the
potentially distorting effects of State aids were, in the past, out-
weighed by the economically more important rules on control of




51 HINDLEY, supra note 11, at 23.
52 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 92 AND 93 OF THE EC
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were enshrined in restrictive bilateral agreements between Mem-
ber States.
The Council has, however, now completed its liberalization pro-
gramme for Community air transport. Therefore, in a situation
of increased competition within the Community there is a clear
need for a stricter application of State aid rules.5"
This reflects the concern in the EU community regarding the
distorting effects of state aid programs. In countries where car-
riers are heavily subsidized by the state, unsubsidized carriers
may feel reluctant to compete, thereby making these destina-
tions unattractive for investment.54 The degree of governmental
intervention in the financial structure of the airline sector will
determine whether a foreign air carrier will be able to gain mar-
ket access through investment.55 At present, the GATS mecha-
nism does not maintain a tough position on state aid/subsidy
programs.56 Article XV states vaguely that members should "rec-
ognize that, in certain circumstances, subsidies may have distor-
tive effects," and it therefore calls upon members to "enter into
negotiations with a view to developing the necessary multilateral
disciplines to avoid such [distortive] effects. ' 57 Until GATS es-
tablishes a concrete provision on state aid, such aid will con-
tinue to impede the efficacy of the GATS free-trade regime.
IV. BILATERALISM VERSUS MULTILATERALISM FOR
GAINING MARKET ACCESS
The current trend in aviation is toward multilateralism.58
Even the traditional markets in Asia are opening up by signing
liberal open sky agreements with the United States-specifically,
nations in the APEC region like Singapore, Brunei, and Malay-
sia.59 On signing an open sky agreement with the United States
in April of 2005, the Civil Aviation Minister of India stated, "The
new agreement will have no restrictions on the number of
flights, offer flexibility in the number of destinations as well as
bilateral code-sharing with domestic carriers."6 ° Regional agree-
53 Id.
54 HINDLEY, supra note 11, at 14-15.
55 Id.
56 GATS, supra note 8, art. XVI.
57 Id. art. XV.
58 Findlay, supra note 7, at 120.
59 Id.
60 India, US Sign Air Services Pact-'More Flights, Lower Fares on Cards,' THE
HINDU BUSINESS LINE, Apr. 14, 2005, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/
2005/04/15/stories/2005041502120100.htm.
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ments, known as common sky agreements, also abound in the
aviation field.6 1 The European Union was the forerunner of re-
gional liberalization, followed by South America with the An-
dean Pact and Africa with the Banjul Accord.62 In 2000, a group
of APEC nations (the United States, Brunei, Chile, New Zealand
and Singapore) signed a multilateral agreement on the ex-
change of traffic rights and other matters related to air trans-
port.63 These trends are encouraging as many nations begin to
experiment with liberalization and have relaxed their market ac-
cess rules for carriers entering from the same region. This
shows an ebbing away of the traditional anxiety about intense
competition and a relaxing of market access norms. The trend
toward open skies, free trade, and liberalized market access has
found support in recent times with the emergence of free trade
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
and the European Free Trade Agreement.64
In his speech at the IATA's 56th Annual General Meeting, Dr.
Assad Kotaite stated that:
The most promising channel for further liberalization remains
the air services agreement, now in regional as well as bilateral
form. The most likely scenario at present is for an expanding
patchwork of phased in liberalization under the aviation um-
brella, both through bilateral agreements and through new or
geographically extended regional agreements, all of which may
eventually offer opportunities for coalescence.65
The other side of this argument is that traditional bilateral ar-
rangements for the exchange of traffic rights and the granting
of market access also have their merits. International aviation
agreements are illustrative of the wide range of economic dis-
parities that exist in the aviation sector among the parties to
these agreements. Even when the agreements are made on a
strict quid pro quo basis, some countries still gain an unfair ad-
vantage over others. For example, while India has entered into
some 180 bilateral agreements, Indian carriers utilize only thirty-
five percent of the available rights and foreign carriers utilize
61 WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 24, at 247.
62 Id. at 248-49.
63 Findlay, supra note 79, at 121.
64 Abeyratne, supra note 5, at 53.
65 Kotaite, supra note 23.
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sixty-five percent of these rights. 66 The flights from fifty-one dif-
ferent nations fly to India, but reciprocally, Indian carriers only
fly to twenty-five foreign countries.6 7 Indian carriers flew a total
of over eighteen million passenger-kilometers in 2003 and
2004.68 By comparison, Lufthansa Regional flies 10.5 million
passengers annually.
69
The aviation sector is zealously guarded by many nations who
view their airspace as an inviolable component of sovereignty.
Aviation sectors of all nations, irrespective of their level of devel-
opment, are prime contributors of their nations' economies.
Nations seldom encourage or even allow for the liberal ex-
change of their traffic rights. History is replete with examples of
how traffic rights negotiations are highly contested. The Ber-
muda Agreement and Bermuda II are examples of the signifi-
cance that states attach to their traffic rights.7 0 The multilateral
platforms for exchanging bilateral traffic rights, namely the In-
ternational Air Services Transit and International Air Transport
Agreements, had 121 and eleven contracting states ratify them,
respectively. 71 Perhaps nations draw comfort from signing sepa-
rate bilateral agreements with other nations and exchanging
traffic rights under the bilateral mode because it preserves the
quid pro quo element in the exchange of traffic rights.
Most aviation regimes are not GATS-compatible. They have
many regulatory, legal and economic impediments that pose a
formidable challenge towards the true attainment of liberaliza-
tion under the GATS regime. Some examples of these impedi-
ments are rigid ownership-control rules, vexatious slot
allocation, dilapidated state aid programs, the decrepit state of
the aviation infrastructure, and onerous cabotage restrictions
that get in the way of gaining market access under the GATS
regime. Most of these were discussed as factors affecting market
access in the previous section. The unconditional
66 R. Krishnan, Can Indian Carriers Soar in the Open Skies?, HINDU BUSINESS LINE,
Dec. 28, 2004, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/12/28/stories/2004
122800290900.htm.
67 Id.
68 DIRECTORATE GEN. OF CIVIL AVIATION, ANNUAL COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRAFIC ON SCHEDULED SERVICES OF NATIONAL CARRIERS FOR LAST
THREE YEARS, http://dgca.nic.in/pub/pubO3-04/chap4/4-05.pdf (last visited
Mar. 13, 2007).
69 Lufthansa Regional at a Glance, http:konzern.lufthansa.com/en/html/al-
lianzen/lufthansa regional, (last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
70 See generally JOHN ,O'BRIEN, INTERNATIONAL LAw 456 (2001).
71 See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 3.
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most-favored-nation ("MFN") clause, which is the cornerstone
of GATS, does not have international approval. Nations are re-
luctant to apply the MFN clause for the granting of market ac-
cess while exchanging traffic rights. Even the most liberal
nations discriminate in granting traffic rights in order to
counteract the severe restraints that their carriers encounter in
foreign markets.
72
A multilateral regime of free trade under GATS that is uncor-
roborated by a multilateral competition-policy regime is super-
fluous. An impartial, fair competition regime within the GATS
framework would go a long way towards ensuring fairness in the
Air Transport Agreement. If the multilateral regime of air trans-
port were to replace the current bilateral air-service agreements
regime, then a state's right to enjoy fair and equal opportunity
in air service has to be ensured, especially when the disparities
among airlines from the developed and developing countries
are fairly high. Although the International Trade Organization
("ITO"), which was the predecessor to GATS, had two chapters
devoted to competition issues, the present system has no multi-
lateral policy in place offering protection against anticompeti-
tive activities pursued by the airlines if the trading of rights
under the air transport regime were to take place under the
GATS regime.73 Articles 7, 8, and 971 of GATS offer some com-
petition safeguards in vague terms, but these provisions are too
dismal to attack any mischief.
Eighty WTO members have adopted antitrust laws and have
specific laws that deal with such issues as price fixing, predatory
72 Ruwantissa I. R. Abeyratne, Competition & Liberalization of Air Transport, 24
WORLD COMPETITION 620 (2001).
73 Id. at 621.
74 Article 7 states, "Wherever appropriate recognition should be based ... on
multilaterally agreed criteria." GATS, supra note 8, art. 7. Alternatively, members
may enter into mutual recognition agreements: "For the purposes of the fulfill-
ment ... of its standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing or certifica-
tion of service suppliers . . . a Member may recognize the education or
experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certification granted in a
particular country." Id.
Article 8 states, "If... a Member grants monopoly rights regarding the supply
of a service covered by its specific commitments, that Member shall notify the
Council for Trade in Services no later than three months before the intended
implementation." Id. art. 8.
Article 9 addresses business practices that restrict trade in services. Countries
are not obligated to end such restrictive business practices, but they are required
to consult with a country that complains about such practices and to "accord full
and sympathetic consideration" to that country's request. See id. art. 8.
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pricing and cartel behavior. But the competition rules need not
be the same in all these countries. "Divergence in national com-
petition policies and a lack of co-operation between competition
authorities create their own barriers to international trade in
uncertainty, complexity and excessive costs."75 What would hap-
pen if one kind of corporate behavior is considered appropriate
in one country but another country has strict rules prohibiting
such behavior? These differences can impede an enterprise in
one state seeking access to another state. There is therefore a
need to harmonize the competition rules under the WTO to
strengthen the argument in favor of switching over to the multi-
lateral regime of GATS. "Trade and competition [has re-
mained] a 'Singapore Issue' and . .. a working group has been
studying this since 1997 .... ,76 A GATS Reference Paper pro-
duced by the WTO lays out some competition principles in the
Telecom Service Sector Annex that can be adopted as a proto-
type for creation of similar rules in the Air Transport Annex.77
The dispute settlement understanding in Annex 2 of the Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
("WTO Agreement") can be used as the method for settling dis-
putes covered by the prospective comprehensive WTO competi-
tion rules when they are in place. 78
The reference paper on the GATS telecom annex was
adopted in full or in part by sixty-one signatories to the GATS
Basic Telecommunications Agreement as commitments in addi-
tion to Article 18 of GATS.79 Although India has adopted some
of the Rreference paper objectives listed in the Telecom Annex,
it has not done so entirely. 80 For example, India has:
scheduled no commitment to prevent cross-subsidization, thus al-
lowing [the Department of Telecommunications] and [Manana-
75 Letter from Ian Valiance, European Servs. Forum Chairman, to M. Pascal
Lamy, European Comm'n Trade Comm'r (May 20, 2003), http://www.wto.org/
english/forums-e/ngo-e/esf agree trade com-e.pdf.
76 Id.
77 World Trade Organization, GATS Reference Paper, 36 I.L.M. 354, 367.
78 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
- Boutheina Guermazi, Exploring the Reference Paper on Regulatory Princi-
ples (unpublished student paper, McGill Faculty of Law) (on file with author).
80 Ashok R. Hehon, India: Adopting a Pro-Competitive Policy for Telecommu-
nications (May 12, 1999), http://www.commercialdiplomacy.org/ma-projects/
maindial.htm.
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gar Telephone Nigam Limited], "both federal telecom service
providers," to subsidize non-competitive local exchange opera-
tions with monopoly revenues from long-distance operations. In-
dia's commitments on interconnection provide that
interconnection with a major supplier be ensured at points "spec-
ified in the license," rather than at "any technically feasible
point" as the [Group on Basic Telecommunications] Reference
Paper states. More significantly, India did not make binding
commitments to Reference Paper principles that ensure inter-
connection in a timely fashion under terms, conditions, or rates
that are transparent, reasonable, economically feasible, nondis-
criminatory, or unbundled.
India accepts the Reference Paper's requirement that universal
service be defined in a transparent and nondiscriminatory man-
ner but not the obligation to make regulation of universal service
competitively neutral or no more burdensome than necessary.
Finally, India scheduled no commitments to publish the normal
time period for reaching a decision on license applications, to
allocate the use of scarce resources in a transparent and nondis-
criminatory manner, or to make publicly available the current
state of allocated frequency bands.8"
Commenting on India's compliance with the Telecommuni-
cations Trade Agreement, the U.S. Council for International
Business points out that India's Access Deficit Charge Regula-
tion has a discriminatory effect on international service provid-
ers and their customers, and that submarine cables are not
being made available on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory ba-
sis by India, both of which are "inconsistent with India's WTO
commitment. '82 Thus, even when a sector-specific attempt to
forge a cohesive competition policy is made, it fails to win the
consensus of all WTO contracting parties. The old controversy
involving development of comprehensive competition rules
within the global trade framework continues unabated. Thus, it
is not difficult to predict that building a sector-specific competi-
tion regime for aviation along the lines of the Reference Paper
of the Telecom Annex is not a process free from worries as to its
acceptability by all members. These worries about acceptability
will only become further accentuated by demand for a multilat-
81 Id.
82 Letter from Thomas M. T. Niles, U.S. Council for Int'l Bus. President, to
Gloria Blue, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Trade Policy Staff Comm.
Executive Sec'y (Dec. 22, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/-on-review-of compli-
ance-withTelecomTrade-Agreements/asset-upload-file700-7030.pdf.
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eral regime of comprehensive competition rules under the
WTO.
V. ISSUES CONFRONTING INDIA'S AVIATION MARKET
AND MARKET ACCESS
Indian aviation is experiencing a privatization boom. Many
new low-cost carriers like Air Deccan, Kingfisher Airlines, and
Spicejet, among others, are proving to offer stiff competition to
the major flag carriers and private jets on most domestic
routes.8" This strongly indicates that the formation of a hub-
and-spoke model in India, paralleling the U.S. hub-and-spoke
model, is not unforeseeable, with main private and flag carriers
concentrating on international traffic, and domestic low-cost
carriers concentrating on the domestic leg of international
travel service. Niche carriers like Air Deccan should therefore
aim at covering small towns at lower fares and building up a
stronger network on that front. If an efficient network can be
developed, Indian carriers will compete with competition from
abroad. Therefore, signing liberal bilateral agreements would
not affect the Indian market.
India's aviation market has become more active than ever due
to a steady increase in population, which naturally leads to in-
creased air travel in India as well as an increase in disposal in-
come. However, the boom will have no significance if India
does not deal with the dismal state of its infrastructure, which is
a major limitation.
Ernst & Young commented:
[T] he challenge is tough as India has poor airport infrastructure,
and upgrading it will need U.S. $10 billion. Or else, the newer
airlines, which choose to fly out of major hubs of Delhi and
Mumbai, may have to park their aircraft overnight at nearby air-
ports like Lucknow or Pune . That would mean higher costs, and
getting misaligned with the peak traffic. 4
There is steady growth in Indian domestic air traffic-cur-
rently nineteen million passengers per day, and it is "poised for
an exponential rise by five million a year until 2010, by [which
time] India may see 50 million people flying every year. As the
Indian aviation market is growing rapidly, the question arises
83 Ameen Kader, Boom in Aviation Job Market for Non-technicals, BUZZLE.COM,
Sept. 13, 2006, http://www.buzzle.com/editorials/9-13-2006-108591.asp.
84 India Open Sky Policy and Dog Fight, http://www.jeffooi.com/archives/
2005/02/more-delayedjo.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
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whether the infrastructure is growing at same pace. ' 5 Criticism
of the infrastructure comes from the airlines at its mercy. Wolf-
gang Prock-Schauer, CEO of Jet Airways, a leading Indian pri-
vate airline, commented:
The infrastructure we have here is insufficient for the current
volume of traffic and the aircrafts we have in the country. And if
you look forward at the growth which we expect, it's clearly insuf-
ficient. I would say that lack of adequate infrastructure is the
single biggest problem we may face in further developing the air
traffic in India.86
International air transport is experiencing a capacity shortage in
contrast to the local air transport sector, and while India's air-
port infrastructure and fleet upgrade plans are touted as a prior-
ity, there has been no formal implementation.87
The Naresh Chandra Committee of December 8, 2003 gave
significant recommendations for invigorating the Indian avia-
tion sector.8 8 Some of the main recommendations focused on
increasing market access through encouragement of privatiza-
tion, foreign investment, affordability, viability and safety.89 The
main recommendations are as follows:
Liberalization of the international air transport segment to be
pursued in a phased manner. In the first phase, private air-
lines based in India should be allowed to provide interna-
tional air transport services to and from India. In the next
phase, India should actively pursue the objective of complete
liberalization of the international air transport segment
through (a) seeking more liberal arrangements under the bi-
laterals and (b) enhancing full-access to wider market seg-
ments by joining a regional or a plurilateral group of
countries with a similar agenda of liberalization.
85 Ameen Kader, Aviation Infrastructure is not Commensurate with Air Traffic
Growth, BUZZLE.COM, June 7, 2005, http://www.buzzle.com/editorials/6-6-2005-
7 1134.asp.
86 Ameen Syed, Call to Spruce up India's Aviation Infrastructure, INDIA TRAVEL
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, http://www.indiatraveltimes.com/aviation2005/Octl4_05.
html.
87 Id.
88 Nishith Desai Assocs., Infrastructure Update: Naresh Chandra Committee
Report on the Civil Aviation Sector (Jan. 8, 2003), http://www.mishithdesai.
corn/ (follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Infrastructure Update:
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Liberalized airports should be allowed to come up irrespec-
tive of proximity to existing airports. However the state and
central governments should refrain from offering concessions
and subsidies to these airports.
* Privatization of the national carriers - Indian Airlines and Air
India - along with the airports in India. In the case of the
former, it is recommended that a consortium of domestic fi-
nancial institutions and foreign institutional investors be cre-
ated, who would hold the shares of the two national carriers.
In the case of the latter, relaxation of the qualification criteria
for bidding so as to broaden the number of competent bid-
ders has been proposed.
* Due to increased privatization and the potential abuse of mo-
nopoly power by the airport operators, the responsibility of
ensuring appropriate levels of regulation should be vested
with the proposed Aviation Economic Regulatory Authority("AERA") .90
While some of these objectives have already been imple-
mented, India's plans for airport privatization have been met
with stiff resistance and have, in effect, been stalled in the past.
But there is new blood in this plan with India's decision to adopt
a joint-venture model for privatization, allowing for public-pri-
vate partnership in the area of airport development.9' India is
also planning to upgrade twenty-two airports in the country to
develop tourism.92
These trends in the Indian market signify the seriousness of
India's commitment to liberalize and provide for increased ac-
cess to its competitive aviation market. Though there are cer-
tain policy and infrastructural impediments in India's path of
attaining liberalization within the meaning of GATS, India is
slowly but progressively embracing liberalization, allowing for
74% foreign direct investment in airport infrastructure, allowing
private airlines to fly on unutilized bilateral routes, and plan-
ning for fleet upgrades. 9 3 A more liberalized market calls for
increased regulation of the competitive elements of the market.
The Naresh Chandra Committee report designates the Compe-
90 Id.






tition Commission of India as the body with oversight of an-
ticompetitive practices.94 Further, "segments of airports and
[Air Traffic Control Corporation] services [are to] be subjected
to independent economic regulation by the proposed [Aviation
Economic Regulatory Authority] .95
VI. CONCLUSION
The air transport industry in India is not in its nascent stage,
though it is in its nascent stage of liberalization. India is pursu-
ing phased liberalization as recommended by the Naresh Chan-
dra Committee Report and is in the second phase, negotiating
for more liberal bilateral agreements and looking to get full ac-
cess to wider markets by entering into regional and multilateral
agreements with countries with similar liberalization agendas.
Acceding to GATS-specific commitments relating to a market ac-
cess regime now might not seem such a distant dream, but it is
still a difficult one to realize because India shows reluctance to
end its protection of flag carriers. It seeks to encourage and
nurture the growth of private enterprise, but not at the cost of
allowing its flag carriers to fall to stiff competition from within
India and abroad. Further, India's aviation market is hobbled
by third-world realities such as the dismal state of its infrastruc-
ture, policy rigidities, and protectionist tendencies towards its
flag carriers. The few bold steps taken in the past to increase
market access will prove to be inconsequential if India does not
adequately address its infrastructural and policy rigidities.
Therefore, unless India confronts these realities soon, it will also
be difficult for it to benefit as much from entering into liberal,
bilateral or multilateral arrangements with other nations.
94 Nishith Desai Assocs., supra note 88.
95 Id.
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